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Vance v. Terrazas Expands the Erosion of
the Equal Rights of Dual Nationals
Laurence J. Terrazas, a dual national,1 applied for a certificate of
Mexican nationality using a form which provided for an express renuncia-
tion of his United States citizenship.' Terrazas applied for the certificate
to satisfy a graduation requirement of a medical school in Monterrey,
Mexico. He had met all other requirements for graduation and was as-
sured by his father, a Mexican government official, that his dual national-
ity status would not be affected.3 The United States Department of State
processed this certificate and determined that Terrazas had committed
an act of expatriation, and this determination was upheld by a federal
district court." On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
reversed and held that section 1481(c) of the Immigration and National-
ity Act' was unconstitutional. This section provides that the prosecuting
party in an expatriation proceeding may prove expatriation merely by a
preponderance of the evidence. The court of appeals based its decision on
the "clear, unequivocal and convincing" standard of proof established in
1. A dual national is one recognized by the laws of two countries as a national of each.
In the case of the United States, the second nationality is respected. Terrazas was an Ameri-
can citizen both because he was born in the United States (jus soli) and because he was
born of an American parent (jus sanguinis). Because Terrazas' father was a Mexican citizen,
under the laws of Mexico, which apply the principle of jus sanguinis, Mexico recognized
him as a Mexican national. See generally 3 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
352 (1942); 2 C. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 1131-32 (2d ed. 1945); 3 J. MOORE, INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW DIGEST 518-19 (1906).
2. It was argued by Terrazas' attorney and factually conceded by the United States
Government that the blanks on the application were not filled in when Terrazas signed it.
See Brief for Appellee, at 22, Vance v. Terrazas, 100 S. Ct. 540 (1980); see also Brief for
Appellant, at 4 n.2.
The application Terrazas signed stated:
I therefore hereby expressly renounce - citizenship, as well as any submis-
sion, obedience, and loyalty to any foreign government, especially to that of
-, of which I might have been subject, all protection foreign to the laws and
authorities of Mexico, all rights which treaties or international law grant to
foreigners; and furthermore I swear adherence, obedience, and submission to
the laws and authorities of the Mexican Republic.
100 S. Ct. at 542 n.2.
3. Brief for Appellee, at 2, Vance v. Terrazas, 100 S. Ct. 540 (1980).
4. A national of the United States loses his nationality upon "taking an oath or making
an affirmation or other formal declaration of allegiance to a foreign state or political subdivi-
sion thereof .... " 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(2) (1976).
Interestingly, the State Department recognized Terrazas' nationality to have been af-
fected upon the issuance of the certificate of nationality, rather than upon his signing the
application for the certificate, the closest he came to taking an oath. Brief for Appellant, at
5 n.2, Vance v. Terrazas, 100 S. Ct. 540 (1980).
5. 8 U.S.C. § 1481(c) (1976).
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the earlier Supreme Court case of Nishikawa v. Dulles,$ on the fact that
several lower courts had applied that stricter standard,' and on the rea-
soning that an individual's overriding interest in his citizenship required
a strict standard for the showing of voluntary intent to renounce one's
citizenship.6
The Supreme Court in Vance v. Terrazas9 reversed the Seventh Cir-
cuit and upheld the constitutionality of section 1481(c). As a result, once
it has been proved by a preponderance of evidence that one has per-
formed an act statutorily deemed expatriating, the presumption of his
voluntary commission must be rebutted. While finding specific intent to
relinquish one's citizenship to be a necessary element in an expatriation
case, 10 the Court dispelled any notion that subjective intent should play
any part in the determination. Thus, the burden of proof is on the
charged citizen. Terrazas may have ended an earlier trend to invalidate
various expatriating statutes. At the very least, it has become another
step in a retreat from the view that the value of citizenship is absolute.1
That view arose from Afroyim v. Rusk,"' an earlier Supreme Court expa-
triation case. In a broader sense, Terrazas may expand the erosion of the
equal rights of all dual nationals and other nonnaturalized citizens.
Lastly, since its application may leave a nonnaturalized citizen stateless,
Terrazas is also a decision with far-reaching international implications
which lacks a discussion of the international policy considerations.
In American jurisprudence, the concept of expatriation began as a
recognition of the need to allow immigrants to the United States to effec-
tively renounce their former citizenship in order to become American citi-
6. 356 U.S. 129 (1958). Nishikawa involved a dual national of the United States and
Japan who was found to have served in the military in Japan during World War II. The
expatriation section of the Code, 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(3) (1976), provides that a United States
national will lose his nationality by "entering, or serving in, the armed forces of a foreign
state unless, prior to such entry or service, such entry or service is specifically authorized in
writing by the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense. ... The Court held that
the former soldier could only be expatriated upon a showing of "clear, convincing and une-
quivocal" evidence of a voluntary act of expatriation. Thus, the Supreme Court established
a stricter standard of proof in an expatriation case while arguing no constitutional basis for
it.
7. See United States v. Matheson, 532 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1976); Tanaka v. I.N.S., 346
F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1965); Peter v. Secretary of State, 347 F. Supp. 1035 (D.D.C. 1972); Cafiero
v. Kennedy, 262 F. Supp. 140 (D.N.J. 1966); United States ex rel. Marks v. Esperdy, 203 F.
Supp. 389 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), rev'd on other grounds, 315 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1963), afl'd, 377
U.S. 214 (1964). In Berenyi v. I.N.S., 385 U.S. 630 (1967), the stricter standard was also
applied.
8. 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(2) (1976).
9. 100 S. Ct. 540 (1980).
10. Id. at 544.
11. See Gordon, The Citizen and the State: Power of Congress to Expatriate American
Citizens, 53 GEo. L.J. 315, 333-38 (1965). Without directly so stating, the "absolutist view"
is ascribed to in Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967). See Note, Acquisition of Foreign
Citizenship: The Limits of Afroyim v. Rusk, 54 CORNELL L. REV. 624 (1969).
12. 387 U.S. 253 (1967).
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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
zens. Thereafter, a corresponding right of Americans to relinquish their
United States citizenship was recognized. The definition of expatriation
evolved to include a statutory recognition of expatriating acts. 8 By 1952
there were ten acts by which one could lose his citizenship." In 1967 the
Court decided Afroyim v. Rusk, thereby invalidating a subsection of the
Immigration and Nationality Act which provided that expatriation oc-
curred when one voted in a foreign election.1 5 By that time the Court had
already invalidated several other subsections of the Immigration and Na-
tionality Act dealing with expatriation. Thus, expatriation could no
longer result from such circumstances as desertion of military or naval
service during time of war,1 6 evasion of military obligations during time of
war, 1 7 or residence of a naturalized citizen in the territory of the foreign
state of his birth or former nationality."8
At the time, the Afroyim decision seemed to preclude Congress from
defining any act as expatriating unless there was an express renunciation
of citizenship by the individual. 9 If Congress could not directly define an
act as expatriating absent express renunciation, then how could it do so
indirectly by altering the burden of proof? If by a mere preponderance of
evidence an individual could be proven to have committed an act statuto-
rily described as expatriating, would not a presumption of voluntariness
limit the opportunity for the actor to offer evidence regarding his subjec-
tive intent? That is, gauged by Afroyim, does not any statutory presump-
tion of intent limit the right of one to retain his citizenship by all acts
other than express renunciation? Accordingly, after 1967 it was expected
that the remaining expatriating statutes would be struck down by courts
following the rationale of Afroyim.
2
0
In fact, this has not occurred. In Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez,",
the Court did strike down a subsection of the expatriation statute on the
13. For a history of the concept of expatriation, see Gordon, supra note 12, at 317-26;
see also Schwartz, American Citizenship After Afroyim and Bellei: Continuing Contro-
versy, 2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1003, 1003-13 (1975).
14. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 414, chap. 477, §
349(a)(1)-(10), 66 Stat. 267 (1952) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a) (1976)).
15. 387 U.S. 253 (1967).
16. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
17. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
18. Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964).
19. In overruling Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44 (1958), the Afroyim Court found the
government's interest in preventing embarrassment to the U.S. Government abroad when-
ever a U.S. citizen voted in an election in a foreign country did not provide sufficient justifi-
cation for a concomitant loss of nationality by the actor unless there was attendant an ex-
press renunciation of nationality. See Black, The Supreme Court-1966 Term, 81 HARV. L.
Rxv. 69, 139 (1967).
20. See Black, supra note 19, at 139.
21. 372 U.S. 144 (1963). Mendoza-Martinez invalidated a subsection of the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act of 1952 that based expatriation on avoidance of the draft during
time of war or a period of national emergency by departing from or remaining outside the
United States. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 414, chap. 477, §
439(a)(10), 66 Stat. 267 (1952).
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ground that it constituted a penal rather than regulatory action. On the
other hand, the Rogers v. Bellei" Court averted a similar determination
by distinguishing Fourteenth Amendment, first sentence citizens, that is,
those born in the United States or naturalized, and upholding the expa-
triation of any others born abroad of an American parent who do not
between the ages of fifteen and twenty-seven come to the United States
and reside here continuously for at least five years. The erosion of the
equal right of each nonnaturalized citizen to his citizenship thus had be-
gun, and Terrazas expands that erosion.
Born in this country, recognized as a dual national, Terrazas was, by
virtue of an oath of allegiance to his "other" nation, deemed to have ex-
patriated himself upon the showing of a mere preponderance of evidence
that he committed the act. The Court denied the existence of an opportu-
nity for a showing of subjective intent on his part. While he would have
been allowed to rebut the presumption of voluntariness on remand, this
opportunity is questionable as he had not previously raised the issue. To
the contrary, Terrazas had always argued that he never intended to expa-
triate himself. That is, by upholding the constitutionality of section
1481(c), the Court arguably allows Congress to do indirectly that which
Afroyim found it could not do directly. Furthermore, a separate class of
"Fourteenth Amendment, first sentence citizens" may now exist. If Ter-
razas had not been a dual national, and had taken the "oath" described
under the circumstances conceded," and the Mexican Government had
refused to grant him the application he sought, would the Court have
ruled that he had thus expatriated himself?
24
Section 1481(c) became law on September 26, 1961. In assessing the
legislative history of section 1481(c) it is striking to note that the purpose
was "to enact evidentiary rules governing adjudication of cases arising
* , * where it is claimed an act or conduct causing loss of nationality was
involuntary. "25 The efficacy of the standard may be argued in a case
where voluntariness was at issue. It was not dealt with in this case.2 6 It is
also pointed out that these rules of evidence are specifically aimed at ob-
22. 401 U.S. 815 (1971).
23. For a discussion of the distinction between "dramatic" and "dull" oaths, and the
requisites of each, see Note, supra note 11, at 631-32. In Duvall, Expatriation Under
United States Law, Perez to Afroyim: The Search for a Philosophy of American Citizen-
ship, 56 VA. L. REv. 404, 438-43 (1970), the "meaningfulness" of the oath is discussed.
24. See Duvall, supra note 23, at 439-41, which discusses the cases of a dual national
who was found not to have expatriated himself upon affirmation of allegiance to Mexico in
order to secure a Mexican passport necessary for travel in connection with his law practice;
and an American raised in Canada who, after taking the oath required for admission to the
Canadian bar, was found not to have relinquished his American citizenship.
25. See S. REP. No. 646, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961), reprinted in [1961] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 2984 (emphasis added).
26. As has been pointed out, Terrazas did not argue that his actions to procure the




viating the rules established in Nishikawa and Gonzales v. Landon,"7 but
will "not affect the rules of evidence applicable to denaturalization cases
laid down in 1943 in Schneiderman v. United States ... ."2 It may have
been an oversight or misstatement in the legislative history, but it is diffi-
cult to understand how the less strict standard of section 1481(c) will cir-
cumvent the problem of the application of Nishikawa leading to "vitiat-
ing outright not only the intent of the statute. . . but doing violence to
its very letter . . . by ascribing involuntariness to absences from the
United States for business purposes or in order to avoid military ser-
vice. '  On the other hand, the State Department can and did deny a
Certificate of Loss of Nationality when an individual was "naturalized in
Canada in order to qualify for admission to the Quebec Bar. ... o Will
officials responsible for expatriation proceedings ever be able to com-
pletely ignore the subjective intent of the actor? Is it arguably discrimina-
tory or unfair to state that subjective intent is immaterial in expatriation
proceedings once they reach the level of the courtroom?
The Court could have espoused cogent reasons to follow Nishikawa
and Gonzales and to set forth stricter standards of proof in expatriation
cases. Because Nishikawa was not grounded on constitutional principles,
however, there is no reason to assume that Congress was absolutely free
to enact the much less strict standard of proof of section 1481(c). To state
that an expatriation proceeding is civil rather than criminal in nature and
therefore that a stricter standard of proof is not necessary may be an
exaltation of form over substance. As Mr. Justice Marshall pointed out in
his dissent in Terrazas, the Court in Addington v. Texas1 found the
"clear, convincing and unequivocal" standard of proof necessary in a case
involving the commission of an individual to a mental hospital.8' Thus,
one's "liberty" arguably is affected by a loss of nationality only if the
Court can abide by more than the most narrow definition of liberty.
By upholding section 1481(c), the Court arguably ignored an incon-
gruity it created. Whereas the stricter "clear, convincing and unequivo-
cal" evidence standard exists to prove the fraudulent attainment of na-
tionality in a denaturalization proceeding, 8 a mere preponderance of
27. 350 U.S. 920 (1950). Nishikawa established the "clear, convincing and unequivocal"
evidence standard in expatriation cases. See note 6 supra. Gonzales equated denaturaliza-
tion and expatriation proceedings.
28. See [1961] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws, at 2984. See also Schneiderman v. United
States, 320 U.S. 118 (1943). Further discussion of Schneiderman appears in note 33 infra.
29. [19611 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws, at 2985. If there is an expatriation question in
the matter referred to in the legislative history, it is not stated therein.
30. Duvall, supra note 23, at 441; PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, TENTH ANNUAL IMMIGRA-
TION & NATURALIZATION INsTrruT 379, 394 n.51 (1977).
31. 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
32. Id. at 432.
33. In Schneiderman v. U.S., 320 U.S. 118 (1943), it was determined that the strict
standard of proof was necessary because "citizenship rights are 'precious and.., conferred
by solemn adjudication,' not to be 'lightly revoked.'" (Citations omitted.) See generally
Liss, The Schneiderman Case: An Inside View of the Roosevelt Court, 74 MICH. L. Rzv.
1980
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evidence standard to prove loss of citizenship in the case of a natural-
born or naturalized citizen is sufficient in a determination of status pro-
ceeding involving the purported commission of an act deemed expatriat-
ing by statute. As policy, the Court may have argued that subjective in-
tent, which is difficult of proof, should not in an expatriation case become
an affirmative defense as it is in a tort case. Yet, it did not. In this
writer's view, the Court should have adopted Chief Justice Warren's argu-
ment that the right involved is paramount," and decided that to allow
the less strict standard of proof was unconstitutional:
Whenever there is a radical upheaval in the Supreme Court's person-
nel in a relatively short time, the possibility of a retreat from the prin-
ciples enunciated in a closely divided decision occurs. Such a retreat
from the principles of Afroyim seems to [have been] implied by the
Burger Court's decision in Rogers v. Bellei."
By the time of Terrazas, the "Burger Court" was missing not only Chief
Justice Warren and Justice Fortas, who were in the majority in Afroyim,
but also the late Justice Black who wrote that opinion.6 As indicated by
Terrazas, the current Court soundly rejects the earlier rationale of
Afroyim which was extremely critical of a policy that would leave a right
as fundamental as citizenship "in the hands of virtually invisible adminis-
trative bodies. 's7 At least in the case of dual nationals, the diminution of
the right of citizenship can be perceived.
Karen L. Yablonski-Toll
500, 551 (1976).
34. Chief Justice Warren first espoused the right of citizenship as the "right to have
rights" in his dissent in Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 64 (1958), which was overruled by
Afroyim.
35. See Schwartz, supra note 13, at 1020-21.
36. Id. at 1020 n.68.
37. See Roche, The Expatriation Cases: "Breathes There the Man, With Soul So Dead
?", 1963 SuPRwm COURT REv. 325, 355-56 (Kurland ed. 1963).
VOL. 9:265
